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Today both the history and philosophical grounding of human rights are matters of great con-
troversy. One prominent figure in the debate is Samuel Moyn, professor of law and history at 
Harvard University. He argues that universal human rights are a relatively recent concept, dat-
ing from the 1940s and that they are, more specifically, a product of the Catholic philosophy 
of that era. The Catholic thinker who reinvented human rights was Jacques Maritain. He was 
among the founders of the French philosophical movement known as personalism, which he 
fashioned into his own Christian (or “integral”) humanism. By 1940, he was turning integral 
humanism into an explicit and robust defense of human rights. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights followed in 1948, and Maritain was one of its intellectual architects. Decades 
before Maritain, however, another tradition of Christian personalism had already developed 
into a theory of human rights. This tradition was Russian neo-idealism. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, it combined Orthodox Christian personalism with a Kantian 
conception of human dignity to produce a theoretically sophisticated defense of human rights. 
The leading figure in this development was Russia’s greatest religious philosopher, Vladimir 
Soloviev. After the Russian Revolution, the intellectual legacy of Soloviev and Russian neo-
idealism was transmitted by Nikolai Berdiaev and the Russian philosophical emigration to 
interwar France, where it helped form the milieu in which Maritain’s thought took shape. 
Indeed, Maritain’s “integral humanism” is strikingly similar to Soloviev’s Christian humanism.
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Today both the history and philosophical grounding of human rights are matters of 
lively scholarly debate. One prominent historian of human rights is Harvard University’s 
Samuel Moyn, author of The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History and Christian Human 
Rights [1; 2]. Moyn’s controversial thesis is that human rights in their specific contem-
porary meaning are a recent innovation, dating from the 1940s. Further, he argues that 
at the time the conceptual basis or grounding for human rights was Christian personal-
ism. But he suggests that personalism “should deeply unsettle prevailing opinion about 
what the concept of human rights implied in its founding era.” He says that personalism 
is a highly ambiguous term; in general, it takes a “spiritual and often explicitly religious 
approach to the human person” [3, p. 86]. He notes that in the 1930s it could carry reac-
tionary connotations. By the 1940s the outstanding personalist philosopher was the great 
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Catholic thinker Jacques Maritain (1882–1973). His 1936 treatise, Integral Humanism, is a 
profound exposition of his philosophy of Christian personalism, but Maritain had not yet 
turned that philosophy into an explicit defense of human rights [4]. That step was taken 
not later than 1940 with his article, “The Conquest of Freedom,” with its glowing passages 
on the true city of human rights [5]. In 1942 came The Rights of Man and Natural Law 
[6], which set the French philosopher on the path to become, in Moyn’s estimation, “the 
premier postwar philosopher of human rights,” indeed “the most prominent thinker of 
any kind across the world to champion rights in the postwar moment” [3, pp. 87, 90]. His 
1942 book on human rights was followed by others, including Christianity and Democracy 
a year later and Man and the State in 1951 [6; 7].
Maritain himself played an important role in preparing the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Michael Rosen has recently called Maritain’s influence “crucial”1. Soon 
after its founding, the UN Commission on Human Rights, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, 
commissioned UNESCO to undertake research in support of its work on an international 
bill of rights. UNESCO invited 150 leading intellectuals from around the world to submit 
papers on philosophical issues raised by human rights, especially the problem of how to 
ground them. Once the papers were received, UNESCO convened a special Committee 
on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man. It met in 1947 and was chaired by 
Maritain, who was then the French ambassador to the Vatican and who had helped from 
the beginning to coordinate the UNESCO project. The research was published in a sym-
posium, which is available on UNESCO’s website2. Maritain wrote the introduction and 
contributed a chapter, “On the Philosophy of Human Rights”. In the introduction, he says 
that “faith in freedom and democracy is founded on the faith in the inherent dignity of 
men and women.” He notes that while the history of declarations of human rights is rela-
tively recent, beginning with the English Bill of Rights (1689), the history of the idea of 
“the dignity and brotherhood of man” is very long [12, p. 3]. By this Maritain indicates that 
human dignity and human rights are distinct ideas with different intellectual histories. 
Today human dignity is generally taken to be the source or ground of human rights. But 
what, then, is the source of human dignity? That is one of the great perennial questions. 
It occupied Maritain — and, before him, Russian idealist and religious philosophers like 
Vladimir Soloviev.
Jacques Maritain was born in Paris in 1882 into a prominent family and was baptized 
Lutheran. At the Sorbonne he studied philosophy and science. There, in 1901, he met 
Raissa Oumançoff, born in Russia into an observant Jewish family that emigrated to Paris 
when she was eight. In the French intellectual climate of materialism and positivism, the 
two university students despaired over the meaningless of life and even vowed to commit 
suicide but were saved from that course of action by the lectures of Henri Bergson. They 
married in 1904. Two years later they converted to Roman Catholicism, as did Raissa’s 
younger sister, Vera, who became a permanent member of the Maritain household. Soon, 
through Raissa, Jacques discovered St. Thomas Aquinas. In the decades that followed, 
he would become one of the century’s great Thomistic philosophers. As Caryl Emerson 
writes:
1 “Catholic influence on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (particularly through the Catholic 
thinker Jacques Maritain)... was crucial” [8, p. 53].
2 It was also published [9]. On Maritain and the UNESCO project, see [10, pp. 210–211; 11, pp. 140, 
160, 165].
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Maritain’s rise in the public and pontifical eye was extraordinary. At the age of thirty-two, eight 
years into his conversion, he received a Catholic professorship after Pope Pius X encountered his 
Thomist critique of Bergsonism. Four years later, in 1917, he was awarded an honorary doctorate 
from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. Maritain’s teaching career began in Paris in 
1912 at the Collège Stanislas, followed by the Institut Catholique [where in 1928 he was appointed 
to the Chair of Logic and Cosmology]. But his influence transcended all academic boundaries 
when his home in Meudon (on the southwestern outskirts of Paris) became a gathering place for 
religious thinkers and modernists artists. From 1923 until the fall of France in 1940, the Maritains 
sponsored a weekly Sunday salon and an annual Thomistic study circle [13, pp. 211–212].
Beginning in the early 1930s, Maritain regularly held visiting professorships in North 
America. In January 1940 the Maritains left France for the Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies in Toronto. With the war in Europe, Maritain and his ethnically-Jewish wife and 
sister-in-law decided not to return. They moved to the United States, where Jacques taught 
at Princeton and Columbia. In late 1944, he accepted appointment as French ambassador 
to the Vatican. He served until 1948 and then held a full-time professorship at Princeton 
until his retirement in 1952. He also lectured at the University of Notre Dame and the Uni-
versity of Chicago. After Vera’s death in late 1959, Jacques and Raissa returned to France. 
Raissa died within several months, and Jacques moved to Toulouse to live with the Little 
Brothers of Jesus. He became a member of this Dominican Order in 1970. At the time of 
this death three years later, he was perhaps the best known Catholic philosopher in the 
world. His intellectual legacy includes sixty books on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, 
social and political philosophy, religious philosophy and theology, the philosophy of his-
tory and the history of philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of education — virtually all 
informed by his Thomism.
Maritain’s Christian tradition was French, Catholic and Thomistic. But he knew 
about and was close to the Russian Christian tradition, first of all through his Russian-
born wife Raissa but also through the Russian religious-philosophical emigration in Paris, 
in which he was immersed. In arguing that Christian personalism was the conceptual 
grounding for human rights in the 1940s, Moyn refers to the “émigré Russian Orthodox 
philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev, who brought to the West an old Russian tradition of re-
ligious personalism” [3, p. 87]. Though Moyn does not develop the connection, Berdiaev 
and Maritain became friends after the Russian religious philosopher moved from Berlin 
to Paris in 1925. He was a regular guest in Meudon. The Maritains also frequented Ber-
diaev’s home in nearby Clamart. Berdiaev’s wife Lydia was a Russian Catholic, like Raissa 
and another Russian émigré in their circle, Helen Iswolsky, who was the daughter of the 
former tsarist foreign minister and ambassador to France. They were all friends; Jacques 
and Helen seemed especially close. In 1942, a year after fleeing France, Helen published an 
important memoir, Light Before Dusk: A Russian Catholic in France, 1923–1941 [14]. The 
“light” was Christian humanism, before the “dusk” of the Nazi invasion. Maritain wrote 
the foreword to the book and celebrated Iswolsky for her Christian humanism, love of 
freedom, and sense of human rights. Her memoir presents Christian humanism as a joint 
project of Maritain and the Russian religious philosophers. She names Vladimir Soloviev 
“the precursor of the Christian humanism of our times” and calls him her “great master” 
[14, p. 91; 15, p. 282].
It is clear that Moyn, in referring to Berdiaev and “the old Russian tradition of re-
ligious personalism,” wishes to cast doubt on Christian personalism as a viable philo-
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sophical grounding for human rights. He is more sympathetic to Kantian idealism, which 
grounds human dignity and personhood in moral autonomy, contrasting the Kantian 
conception to “the “primacy of a very different human person [the Christian personalist 
one] in the years when the Universal Declaration was framed” [3, p. 105]. In fact, “the old 
Russian tradition of religious personalism,” as represented by philosophers such as So-
loviev and Berdiaev, existed in combination with Kantian idealism. This combination was 
conspicuous in Russian neo-idealist liberal theory in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, and it produced a robust and theoretically sophisticated defense of human 
dignity and human rights — decades before Maritain and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.3 Moyn might be right in claiming that “Kantians were few and far between 
in the 1940s,” but they were clearly present in pre-revolutionary Russian philosophical 
liberalism, where they were at home with Orthodox Christian personalists. The history of 
human rights in Russian neo-idealism thus calls into question the claims of the recent his-
toriography that human rights, after their initial formulation in the Atlantic revolutions of 
the late eighteenth century, “almost disappeared from political and legal discourse in the 
nineteenth century” and that “human rights in their specific contemporary connotations 
are a relatively recent invention” [17, pp. 1, 3].
***
As I noted above, Helen Iswolsky regarded Vladimir Soloviev as “the precursor of 
the Christian humanism of our times.” Maritain’s “integral humanism” is indeed strik-
ingly similar to Soloviev’s Christian humanism. To see that, let us turn first to Soloviev, 
then (and in more detail) to Maritain. The central concept of Soloviev’s whole religious 
philosophy is the concept of bogochelovechestvo, variously translated as Godmanhood, 
theanthropy, divine humanity, or the humanity of God. According to Paul Valliere, “the 
concept of bogochelovechestvo was the vehicle for a principled and profound Orthodox 
Christian humanism” [18, p. 12]. It refers to humanity’s divine potential and vocation, the 
ideal of our divine self-realization in and union with God. The patristic doctrine of theosis, 
or salvation as deification, is the theological core of the concept of bogochelovechestvo, 
but Soloviev dramatically broadened it, shifting the emphasis from mysticism, monastic 
contemplation, and asceticism to an activist, socially-premised conception of human per-
fectibility [19]. Bogochelovechestvo is, in short, the divine-human project of building the 
Kingdom of God.
Soloviev based his concept of bogochelovechestvo on his philosophical anthropol-
ogy, or conception of human nature. In this he closely followed Kant’s teaching on human 
dignity4, which has been vastly influential ever since it appeared in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals in 1785. Kant’s key argument is that the ground of human dignity 
consists in the dual capacity of reason (first) to recognize or posit ideals such as the moral 
3 The living link between pre-revolutionary Russian neo-idealism and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was Sergius Hessen (1887–1950), on whom see [16, ch. 7]. Hessen contributed a chapter 
to the UNESCO volume on the philosophy of human rights, “The Rights of Man in Liberalism, Socialism 
and Communism”. In Walicki’s words, “It seems justified, therefore, to say that the man who embodied the 
last link in the progressive evolution of Russian liberalism, who was so deeply steeped in the traditions of 
Russian thought, fully participated in preparing the Charter of Human Rights for our times” [16, p. 439].
4 As did, before him, Boris Chicherin [20, p. 285–290]. 
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law and (second) to determine the will according to such ideals. Kant called this core hu-
man capacity the autonomy of the will or self-determination.
In his Lectures on bogochelovechestvo (delivered in 1878), his doctoral thesis Critique 
of Abstract Principles (defended and published in 1880), and in other works, Soloviev stip-
ulates that human beings combine in themselves three principles: the absolute or divine 
principle, the material principle, and (between them) the distinctively human principle, 
which is rational autonomy or the capacity for self-determination5. He derived the middle, 
human principle of autonomy entirely from Kant6. Bogochelovechestvo combines the di-
vine and human principles. It is the free human realization of the divine idea in ourselves 
and in the world: again, deification or theosis. Soloviev always maintained that bogo- 
chelovechestvo could not be achieved without human autonomy: “The divine content must 
be appropriated by a human being from within himself, consciously and freely,” through 
the fullest development of human rationality [23, p. 410]. The autonomy and perfectibility 
by which our intrinsic potential divinity alone can be realized from the ground of human 
dignity. Salvation apart from self-determination would violate human dignity or at any 
rate be accomplished past it.
The Russian philosopher Semën Frank wrote that the concept of bogochelovechestvo 
extends the Chalcedonian dogma of Christ the God-man’s two natures to all of the exist-
ence [24, pp. 15–16]. It extends it, at any rate, to all human persons. I would argue that 
the concept is a distinctively Kantian interpretation of Chalcedon that emphasizes the 
autonomy of the human principle relative to the divine. In every human person, the divine 
element (the “image of God” in us) must be freely recognized and embraced by the hu-
man element (that is, by reason and will). Our task is to bring our nature into ever closer 
“likeness” or conformity with God. Christ achieved this perfect conformity, and he did so 
through an act of the rational human will. As Oliver Smith put it, “The humanity of Christ 
is ‘spiritualized’ or divinized not despite his humanity but because of it” [25, p. 119]. We 
are to follow Jesus’ example and teaching: “Be perfect even as your Father in heaven is 
perfect” (Matthew 5: 48, one of Soloviev’s favorite verses). This is the true, divine-human 
path to the kingdom of God: divine in that God is the ideal of perfection, human in that 
the task of perfectibility is ours. Soloviev followed Kant in thinking that the kingdom of 
God could come only through the kingdom of ends, Kant’s famous ideal of a moral order 
whose members respect each other as persons or ends-in-themselves7.
Soloviev’s most powerful and systematic defense of human dignity is a Justification of 
the Good (1897), one of the great modern works of moral and religious philosophy. The 
very concept of the “justification of the good” is human perfectibility or progress toward 
bogochelovechestvo. In his treatise, Soloviev called Kant’s conception of morality “one of 
the greatest achievements of the human mind” [27, p. 135]. He preferred to speak of the 
divine principle or divine image in us, but it functioned as the ideal just like Kant’s moral 
law, while the human “likeness” to God described our capacity for self-determination and 
5 This and next three paragraphs are drawn from [20, pp. 291–293]. For further development see [21].
6 In Critique of Abstract Principles, Soloviev closely paraphrases and directly translates large parts 
of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [22, pp. 44–62]. In addition to these two chapters, he de-
votes three more, plus an appendix, to Kant’s ethics and conception of rational autonomy, drawing also on 
(paraphrasing and quoting at length) the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason [22, 
pp. 62–72, 89–116, 371–397].
7 For further development, see [26].
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infinite perfectibility according to the image or ideal [27, p. 145]8. This “double infinity” 
of the image and likeness belongs to everyone. “It is in this that the absolute significance, 
dignity, and worth of human personhood consist, and this is the basis of its inalienable 
rights”9. That is one of the most significant statements in Soloviev’s whole corpus: it for-
mulates modern Christian Orthodox personalism, does so in a Kantian framework, and 
makes the explicit connection to human rights. In another capacious passage, he wrote: 
“The absolute value of a man is based, as we know, upon the possibility inherent in his rea-
son and his will of infinitely approaching perfection or, according to the patristic expres-
sion, the possibility of becoming divine (theosis)” [27, p. 296].
Soloviev consistently held that human perfectibility (again, progress toward bogo-
chelovechestvo) is realized in society and develops in history. In his social philosophy, he 
embraced the idea of natural law, which he thought ought to guide the actual, historical 
development of positive law as its rational essence and normative ideal. The goal is an 
ever more lawful and just society, and the ever fuller realization of human potential. In 
his words, “Freedom, as the foundation of all human existence, and equality, as the neces-
sary form of all societal existence, in combination form human society as a lawful order” 
[22, p. 155]10. Law is essential but not the highest principle of Soloviev’s social philosophy. 
It deals with the means by which people pursue their ends, not the ends themselves (which 
ends Soloviev defined as the pursuit of moral perfection in the free unity of spiritual love). 
He directly followed Kant in defining his social ideal as the ethical (and not merely ju-
ridical) community of the “kingdom of ends,” which both philosophers thought of as the 
church. Soloviev called it “free theocracy”11.
***
With that overview of Soloviev, we can proceed to Maritain. Their conceptions of 
Christian humanism are strikingly similar. This is obvious first of all in that Maritain’s 
“integral humanism” integrates the human and divine, just as bogochelovechestvo does. 
Both philosophers agreed on the main principles of Christian humanism. Let me identify 
the five most important. First, the essential principle of integral humanism is the human 
capacity for self-determination toward and integration into the divine. Second, that capac-
ity is the ground of human dignity, a paramount principle for both philosophers. Third, 
and closely related to the principle of human dignity, is their Christian personalism: the 
idea that human beings are persons because they are created in the image and likeness 
of God and are called to progressively realize the divine likeness in themselves, in soci-
ety, and in the world. Fourth, the transcendent fulfillment of human self-determination 
8 This interpretation of Genesis 1: 26 was not original with Soloviev but can be traced to the Eastern 
Church Fathers. Patrick L. Michelson has reconstructed the history of the idea of “similitude anthropol-
ogy” — free “assimilation to God” and “moral deification” — and its Russian reception [28].
9 [27, p. 176]. At points I have modified the Duddington translation in accordance with the Russian 
text: Soloviev, V. S. (1911), “Opravdanie dobra: nravstvennaia filosofiia”, in Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira 
Sergeevicha Solovieva, vol. 8, Prosveshchenie Publ., St. Petersburg, Russia, pp. 3–516.
10 Despite certain changes in his legal philosophy in Justification of the Good, Soloviev remained con-
vinced of the basic principles of law that he set forth in Critique of Abstract Principles. He reprinted its two 
main chapters on law, together with two sections from Justification of the Good, in Law and Morality: Essays 
in Applied Ethics (1897), which serves as a good overall statement of his philosophy of law [29]. For astute 
analyses of Soloviev’s social and legal philosophy, see [16, pp. 165–212; 30]. 
11 For details, see [26, pp. 223–228].
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toward and integration into the divine is theosis or deification12. Fifth is a social philoso-
phy of historical progress oriented toward the suprahistorical ideal of the kingdom of 
God. It is a social philosophy premised on human dignity, human rights, and the rule of 
law, though both philosophers saw it as leading toward a qualitative moral transformation 
in human relations, in which, presumably toward the end of history, law would give way to 
love — a love at once divine and fraternal. Soloviev called this social ideal “free theocracy”, 
and Maritain called it the “historical ideal of a new Christendom”. Both philosophers used 
the term “Christian politics” as the way toward the ideal.
In Integral Humanism, Maritain devotes much attention to Russia Communism and 
to the Soviet situation, with numerous references to Iswolsky, Berdiaev, Dostoevsky, Wal-
demar Gurian, Boris Souvarine, Marx, Lenin, Bukharin, and even Gorky. There is only 
one reference to Soloviev, and it is not particularly significant [4, p. 194]. Nonetheless, 
an explication of Maritain’s text will demonstrate that the religious philosophies of both 
thinkers are “integral humanisms.” Other scholars are also pursuing this comparison 
[31]13. In 2008, there appeared an edited volume, Vladimir Soloviev, Jacques Maritain: Le 
personnalisme chrétien [32].
***
In his treatise Maritain characterizes integral humanism as “a theocentric or truly 
Christian humanism,” in contrast to anthropocentric humanism, which has dominated 
the modern era, with roots in the Renaissance and Reformation, and which tends to-
wards naturalism and atheism [4, p. 169]. The roots of integral humanism are in medieval 
Christendom, which “embodied in its sacral forms a virtual and implicit humanism.” This 
implicit humanism began to manifest itself in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, espe-
cially with St. Thomas Aquinas, but the modern era displaced it. Maritain’s project is the 
revival of integral humanism, but in a modern form — “no longer sacral but secular or 
lay”. In the face of contemporary inhuman ideologies such as fascism and communism, he 
hoped that integral humanism could meet the pressing Christian need for “a sound social 
philosophy and a sound philosophy of modern history”. He saw it has the heart of a new 
Christendom [4, p. 155].
In the same way that some humanisms are irreligious or indeed antireligious, obvi-
ously not all conceptions of religion qualify as humanistic. Maritain refers to a “certain 
theological inhumanity” in medieval Catholicism that came from the “less sound parts 
of the Augustinian synthesis.” He hastens to add that “St. Thomas put everything in or-
der again, but too late for medieval thought to be able to profit from his principles and 
bring them to fruition” [4, pp. 159–160]. His harshest indictment is directed against his 
contemporary Karl Barth, whose position he describes as archaic and as marked by a 
return to the pure pessimism of primitive Protestantism (especially Calvinism), by pri-
mordial antihumanism, and by the annihilation of man before God [4, p. 196]. The way 
12 In Integral Humanism, Maritain does not use the term deification. He writes rather of the conquest 
of freedom, spiritual perfection, and attainment to the very life of God. However, in his seminal 1940 article 
“The Conquest of Freedom”, he defines that conquest as deification.
13 Ana Siljak (Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada) has written papers exploring the connections be-
tween French Catholic and Russian Orthodox personalism in interwar France, within the context of the 
twentieth-century history of human rights. 
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forward, toward a new Christendom animated by the ideal of the kingdom of God, is the 
“integralist and progressive” position of Catholicism, especially of St. Thomas Aquinas 
[4, p. 196]. Maritain wrote simply: “I think that the theology of St. Thomas will dominate a 
new Christendom” [4, p. 199]. The “new age of Christian culture” that he hoped for would 
be an age of integral humanism, in which “the creature would not be belittled or anni-
hilated before God; and neither would it be rehabilitated without God or against God; it 
would be rehabilitated in God”. Integral humanism is the “humanism of the Incarnation”. 
To return to it “is to save the ‘humanist’ truths disfigured by four centuries of anthropo-
centric humanism” [4, p. 197].
What are these truths that are to be saved, restored, and (where necessary) modern-
ized by integral humanism? I would enumerate them as follows. They largely overlap with 
the five shared principles that I listed above, but the following five are specific to Maritain 
(he does not precisely list them). First is personalism, which is the core of integral human-
ism. In a famous formulation, Maritain wrote:
A person is a universe of spiritual nature endowed with freedom of choice and constituting 
to this extent a whole which is independent in face of the world — neither nature nor the State 
can lay hold on this universe without its permission. And God himself, who is and acts within, 
acts there in a particular manner and with a particularly exquisite delicacy, which shows the value 
He sets on it: He respects its freedom, at the heart of which He nevertheless lives; He solicits it, 
He never forces it [4, p. 158].
The value that God places on the human person and his respect for its freedom are 
markers of human dignity, the second truth of integral humanism, closely related to the 
first14. Freedom is an essential human quality, but it must be properly integrated with 
grace. Their integration — “holy freedom”, as Maritain once calls it [4, p. 255] — is the 
third truth of integral humanism. It is part of what Maritain calls the Christian conception 
of man, according to which man (or the human person) “is made for a supernatural end: 
to see God as God sees himself, he is made to attain to the very life of God; he is traversed 
by the solicitations of actual grace, and if he does not oppose his power of refusal, he bears 
within him even here below the properly divine life of sanctifying grace and its gifts” [4, 
p. 158]. The supernatural end of attaining to the very life of God is deification or theosis, 
the fourth truth of integral humanism [5, pp. 173–179].
This supernatural end enjoins human beings to work for the kingdom of God, an ul-
timately transcendent ideal but one that ought to be approximated by the “socio-temporal 
realization of the Gospel truths” [4, pp. 155, 179, 211], or by what Maritain, like Soloviev, 
calls “Christian politics” [4, pp. 227, 293]. Human work toward the kingdom of God is 
the fifth truth of integral humanism. In a particularly rich passage, Maritain explains how 
“temporal history prepares enigmatically its final consummation in the kingdom of God”:
[T]he aim that the Christian sets himself in his temporal activity is not to make of this world 
itself the kingdom of God, it is to make of this world, according to the historical ideal required by 
the different ages... the place of a truly and fully human earthly life, i.e., one which is assuredly 
full of defects, but it is also full of love, whose social structures have as their measure justice, the 
14 In Maritain’s words, integral humanism “really and effectively respects human dignity and does 
justice to the integral demands of the person” [4, p. 155].
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dignity of the human person, and fraternal love, and which to this extent prepares the coming of 
the kingdom of God in a filial, not servile, manner [4, pp. 221–222].
Today’s historical ideal is that of a new Christendom, founded on the same principles, 
analogically applied, as medieval Christendom, but essentially distinct because it would 
be modern. For this Christian civilization, Maritain wrote in words that could have been 
Soloviev’s, “to progress toward God will be, it seems above all, to prepare for man the ter-
restrial conditions of a life into which sovereign love can descend and make in man and 
with him a work divinely human” [4, p. 199].
Maritain devotes two chapters (the fourth and fifth) of Integral Humanism to the 
“historical ideal of a new Christendom”. He lays the groundwork in the preceding chapter 
(“The Christian and the World”) by emphasizing the importance for Christian social phi-
losophy of the distinction between the temporal and spiritual orders, according to which 
the latter must vivify the former [4, pp. 214, 223]. The problem of the kingdom of God is 
crucial to understanding the proper relationship between the two orders. In an early and 
prescient analysis, Maritain distinguishes between the German concept politische Theolo-
gie and the French concept théologie politique. “The French meaning... is that politics, like 
everything that relates to the moral order, is a subject for the theologian as well as for the 
philosopher, because of the primacy of the moral and spiritual values engaged in the po-
litical order itself ” [4, p. 215]. In other words, théologie politique is the theological critique 
of politics by higher moral and spiritual values such as justice and human dignity. Such a 
critique is possible because the spiritual/temporal distinction is preserved.
By contrast, politische Theologie, at least in Carl Schmitt’s version (to which Maritain 
refers), represents the political as “theological,” meaning that, as Maritain puts it, “politi-
cal realities are themselves of the divine or sacred order” [4, p. 215]. If political realities 
are absolute, “total”, or “holy” ones, as Schmitt contends, then there are no higher values 
according to which they might be critiqued or by which their power might be limited. In 
short, Schmitt’s conception of political theology obliterates the distinction between the 
temporal and the spiritual, and in the process absolutizes the political. A similar oblitera-
tion and resultant absolutization can be observed in the closely related idea of totalitarian 
ideologies as “political religions”. According to that idea (advanced contemporaneously by 
Berdiaev, René Fülöp-Miller, Waldemar Gurian, Eric Voegelin, and others), communism 
and fascism were secularized forms of millenarianism and eschatology. Maritain devotes 
many pages to various aspects of this idea, analyzing the “religious atheism of Soviet Com-
munism” [4, p. 190] and observing that “Marxism expects salvation and the realization, as 
it were, of the kingdom of God” [4, p. 184 and ch. 2 passim].
The “historical ideal of a new Christendom” restores the temporal/spiritual distinc-
tion effaced by totalitarianism. It refers to a secular, modern temporal order, but one ori-
ented toward the spiritual order of the kingdom of God. It is, in short, the heart of integral 
humanism as a Christian social or political philosophy. A new Christendom would have 
some features in common with medieval Christendom and some distinctive features.
Maritain identifies three common aspects of Christendom as a temporal city “ab-
stractly considered” (that is, whether medieval or modern): communal, personalist, and 
“peregrinal”. By communal he means that the city (or society) has a common good that 
is higher than the individual goods and interests of its members, insofar as the latter are 
parts of the social whole. “This common good is essentially the right earthly life of the 
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assembled multitude, of a whole composed of human persons”. However, “this temporal 
common good is not the ultimate end. It is ordered to something better: the intemporal 
good of the person, the conquest of his perfection and spiritual freedom” [4, pp. 236–
237]15. Hence the personalist aspect: it is essential that the temporal common good “re-
spect and serve the supratemporal ends of the human person”. The temporal common 
good has its own goodness, “but precisely on condition that it recognize this subordination 
and that it not make of itself the absolute good”. In sum: the highest end of political society 
is “that each person will be positively aided in the progressive conquest of his full life as a 
person and of his spiritual freedom” [4, p. 237]. Maritain believes that there is something 
of an antinomy between the communal and personalist aspects: persons (as individual 
members of society) are subordinate parts of a greater temporal common good, yet (in 
their supratemporal destiny) they are also the ends to which it is subordinate [4, p. 238]. 
Finally, the “peregrinal” aspect of the temporal city refers to its being but a moment, the 
earthly moment, in the spiritual destiny of persons. In it, persons are en route and will 
leave it behind [4, p. 239].
In addition to the three features that it shares with the medieval sacral conception, 
the historical ideal of a new Christendom (modern and secular) has several features of its 
own. It is pluralist (“organic heterogeneity in the very structure of civil society”); it insists 
on the autonomy of the temporal order; it is resolutely committed to the freedom of per-
sons, to their fundamental equality, and to democracy; and its main principle and task is 
the realization of a fraternal community and the cultivation of a love at once divine and 
human. Maritain’s exposition of some of these features is involved, especially their distinc-
tiveness relative to the medieval sacral order. These principles of a new Christendom are 
carried into his next works on political philosophy, where they are presented more clearly. 
But it worth quoting one of his concluding statements, which also could have been So-
loviev’s: Under a new Christendom, “there would begin to flower the integral humanism, 
the humanism of the Incarnation... which would admit of no other theocracy than that of 
divine love” [4, p. 306].
***
By 1940, Maritain was turning integral humanism into an explicit defense of human 
rights. His 1942 book The Rights of Man and Natural Law clearly shows this development. 
Both of these ideas  — human rights and natural law  — are new compared to Integral 
Humanism. Human dignity was all along one of Maritain’s main principles, but from it 
he now gets to human rights through the idea of natural law. But first, he identifies four 
principles of a genuinely free society or democracy16, all directly from his 1936 treatise: 
personalism, communalism, pluralism, and theism. Personalism remains paramount. 
Maritain writes that “an essential characteristic of any civilization worthy of the name is 
respect and feeling for the dignity of the human person” [6, p. 65–66]. He emphasizes that 
15 Again, in “The Conquest of Freedom”, Maritain defines this as deification.
16 “Democracy” is his preferred term because he thinks it most readily conveys the idea of human dig-
nity. He strongly dislikes the term “liberalism”, which he associates with the discredited French Third Repub-
lic that capitulated before the Nazis. He also uses the more elaborate term “humanist political philosophy”, 
but call it what you will his political philosophy is a form of liberalism — one that has striking similarities 
with Russian philosophical liberalism. After all, fundamentally liberalism is a political philosophy grounded 
in human rights and their defense.
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human personhood is an irreducible mystery that invokes comparison with the divine. 
In a significant passage, he writes: “The worth of the person, his liberty, his rights arise 
from the order of naturally sacred things which bear upon them the imprint of the Father 
of Being and which have in him the goal of their movement. A person possesses absolute 
dignity because he is in direct relationship with the Absolute, in which alone he can find 
his complete fulfillment” [6, p. 67]. In short, “the person is a spiritual whole made for the 
Absolute” [6, p. 112].
Clearly, Maritain’s understanding of human dignity and of personhood is explicitly 
metaphysical and theistic, so that the first and fourth principles — personalism and the-
ism — of his integral humanist political philosophy are inherent in each other. Maritain is 
aware that “strangers to Christian philosophy” and even non-theists can have a “profound 
and authentic” appreciation for human dignity, but his view is that Christian philosophy, 
especially his own Thomism, is the highest rational justification of it [6, p. 67].
His second and third principles are communalism and pluralism. “The person is 
whole,” Maritain writes, “but he is not a closed whole, he is an open whole” [6, p. 68]. 
Human beings are by their nature communal and social. The first chapter of The Rights of 
Man and Natural Law is called “A Society of Human Persons.” It, too, draws directly on 
Integral Humanism. Society is oriented toward the common good, but this is the common 
good of human persons, so no one of them can be treated merely as a means for the end of 
the common good. Persons are the ends of the common good; society exists for their full-
est possible self-realization and highest fulfillment. “The common good of society is their 
communion in the good life” [6, p. 70]. Ultimately that communion is in the Absolute or 
in the Kingdom of God, so “the human person transcends all temporal societies and is 
superior to them” [6, p. 73].
The third principle, pluralism, flows naturally from the quality of persons being free 
wholes. On this personalist foundation Maritain uses the principle of pluralism primarily 
to stand for a free society that consists of “autonomous communities which have their own 
rights, liberties and authorities” (e. g., the family, civil society, state, church, and interna-
tional community). Though Maritain did favor progress toward what he called a “vitally 
Christian society,” he opposed every form of religious coercion or clericalism and insisted 
that the principle of pluralism meant respect for freedom of conscience at all levels of 
society.
We can now return to the problem of what Maritain sees as the true sources of faith in 
human dignity and in human rights. Maritain was one of the great philosophers of human 
dignity. He held human dignity to be the source or ground of human rights, but that begs 
the question, What is the source or sources of human dignity or of absolute human value? 
One easy answer for the theist is “God”, but that is a source in some sense external to hu-
man nature and so such an answer is, on its own, inadequate for the humanist. Maritain 
the humanist identifies three sources within human nature: reason, freedom, and love, 
capacities which give the person a “spiritual superexistence” or soul. But Maritain the the-
ist knows that the ultimate source of human dignity, as of everything, is God. His solution 
is the concept of natural law, which enables him to integrate both approaches. He defines 
natural law as “an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and according to 
which the human will must act in order to attune itself to the necessary ends of the human 
being” [6, p. 104]. Maritain believed that natural law came from God and that, moreover, it 
provided rational grounds for theistic belief. But human nature, he writes, “is in itself suf-
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ficient to convince us that... natural law is something as real in the moral realm as the laws 
of growth and senescence in the physical” [6, p. 104]. Natural law — in our knowledge of 
it and in our capacity for self-determination according to it — was the source of human 
dignity and of the rights that come from such dignity. For theists like Maritain, it also pro-
vided grounds for belief in a transcendent divine reality. Natural law was the specific way 
his integral humanism was, or rather became, a philosophy of human rights.
***
Maritain’s integral humanism did not become an explicit philosophy of human rights 
until about 1940. By contrast, “the old Russian tradition of religious personalism” was a 
philosophy of human rights from its origins in the pre-revolutionary period. Soloviev’s 
legacy inspired the seminal work Problems of Idealism, which appeared in 1902 and which 
advanced a neo-idealist conception of personhood and of human rights [33]. The vol-
ume’s impressive exposition of the philosophical foundations of liberalism strategically 
coincided — as its organizers intended — with the first stages of the Russian Liberation 
Movement that would culminate in the Revolution of 1905. The project was planned by 
Peter Struve, who had just completed his evolution from Marxism to idealism, and by 
Pavel Novgorodtsev, a legal philosopher at Moscow University. Like Maritain later, they 
grounded human rights in natural law.
In 1901, as he was planning Problems of Idealism, Struve published one of his most 
remarkable essays (and dedicated it to Soloviev), “What is True Nationalism?” [34]17. For 
him, any true nationalism must rest on true liberalism, or on recognition of the absolute 
value of the person. He extols the Kantian principle of human dignity through individual 
self-determination, stating that it ought to be the moral foundation of any just social or 
political order [34, pp. 503, 504, 511, 520]. The fullest realization of personhood requires, 
in turn, the guarantee of individual rights: “The idea and practice of such rights, in our 
view, reveal all the deep philosophical meaning and all the enormous practical significance 
of the remarkable doctrine of natural law, lying at the basis of all true liberalism.” Natural 
law is absolute, “rooted in the ethical concept of the person and its self-realization, and 
serving as the measure of all positive law” [34, p. 507]. True liberalism demands “recogni-
tion of the inalienable rights of the person,” which rights cannot be trumped by any higher 
national or state values. Thus it is “also the only form of true nationalism” [34, p. 512]18.
Struve’s own contribution to Problems of Idealism did not directly address the topic 
of natural or human rights, but several other contributions did. Novgorodtsev devoted 
his (masterful) chapter to the revival of natural law. He contrasts the medieval conception 
of natural law (which tended to identify it with the will of God) to its modern meaning, 
which is the inalienable rights of the person. Echoing Struve, he wrote, “Natural law is the 
expression of the autonomous, absolute significance of the person, a significance that must 
belong to it in any political system. In this respect natural law is more than a demand for 
17 The article was published under the pseudonym “P. Borisov.” Reprinted in Struve, P.  (1902), Na 
raznye temy (1893–1901 gg.): Sbornik statei, Tipografiia A. E. Kolininskogo, St. Petersburg, Russia, pp. 526–
555. For analysis see [35, pp. 300–307].
18 Struve later reversed himself on this position. In his famous 1908 essay, “Great Russia,” he advanced 
a Darwinian conception of the state as a “special organism” that lived by its own supreme laws of existence 
(such as the striving for power) and that was not subject to any higher law. See [36]. For analysis see 
[37, pp. 88–92].
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better legislation: it represents the protest of the person against state absolutism, remind-
ing us of the unconditional moral basis that is the only proper foundation of society and 
the state” [33, p. 313]. Berdiaev also contributed to Problems of Idealism. In one passage he 
writes: “Legal and political progress is nothing other than the realization and guarantee-
ing of the absolute natural rights of man, which need no historical sanction because these 
rights are the immediate expression of the moral law, given before any experience” [33, 
p. 178].
In conclusion, I would suggest that its neo-idealist, Christian personalist defense of 
human rights distinguished Russian liberalism from other contemporary European lib-
eralisms, such as British utilitarianism, which were generally positivistic in their philo-
sophical foundations. If there were a relative paucity of appeals to human rights in nine-
teenth-century European liberalism as a whole, as some historians today claim, then this 
philosophical difference might help to explain it. That difference might also explain why 
Maritain, Catholic and Thomist, found so much in common with his Orthodox and Kan-
tian Russian predecessors.
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Концепции интегрального гуманизма: Жак Маритен, 
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Для цитирования: Пул Рэндалл А.  Концепции интегрального гуманизма: Жак Маритен, Влади-
мир Соловьев и история прав человека // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Фило-
софия и конфликтология. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 1. С. 92–106. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2019.108 
(In English)
Сегодня как история, так и философское обоснование прав человека — вопросы ожив-
ленных научных дискуссий. Одной из видных фигур в подобных дебатах является Са-
муэль Мойн, профессор права и истории Гарвардского университета. Он утверждает, 
что всеобщие права человека — относительно недавняя концепция, они возникли в 
1940-х годах и представляют собой продукт, в частности, католической философии 
той эпохи. «Изобрел» права человека католический мыслитель Жак Маритен. Он был 
одним из основателей французского философского движения, известного как пер-
сонализм, который он создал в своем собственном христианском (или «целостном») 
гуманизме. К 1940 г. он превратил интегральный гуманизм в явную и надежную защи-
ту прав человека. В 1948 г. появилась Всеобщая декларация прав человека, а Маритен 
был одним из ее интеллектуальных архитекторов. Однако за десятилетия до Мари-
тена другая традиция христианского персонализма уже превратилась в теорию прав 
человека. Это был российский неоидеализм. В конце XIX и начале XX вв. он сочетал 
православный христианский персонализм с кантианской концепцией человеческого 
достоинства, чтобы создать теоретически изощренную защиту прав человека. Ведущей 
фигурой в этом развитии был величайший религиозный философ России Владимир 
Соловьев. После русской революции интеллектуальное наследие Соловьева и русского 
неоидеализма было передано Николаем Бердяевым и русской философской эмиграци-
ей в межвоенную Францию, где оно помогло сформировать среду, в которой сложилась 
мысль Маритена. Действительно, «интегральный гуманизм» Маритена поразительно 
похож на христианский гуманизм Соловьева.
Ключевые слова: человеческое достоинство, права человека, либерализм, персонализм, 
христианский гуманизм, русский неоидеализм, обожествление, богочеловечество, 
Кант, Жак Маритен, Владимир Соловьев, Николай Бердяев.
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